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The Eﬀect of Cost-share Programs on
Ground Water Exploitation and
Nonpoint-source Pollution under
Endogenous Technical Change
C. S. Kim and Todd Guilfoos
Empirical studies suggest that cost-share programs are unlikely to reduce
exploitation of ground water and nonpoint-source pollution. By introducing an
induced irrigation technology in our model, we ﬁnd theoretically that the optimal
amount of irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer increases (decreases) when the
increased rate of the marginal net economic beneﬁts from their use with an
induced irrigation technology exceeds (is less than) an increase in the rate of
irrigation eﬃciency. Our results suggest that producers should use relatively
more irrigation water and fertilizer when greater quantities of high-value crops
are grown because producers will adopt improved irrigation technologies for
such crops.
Key Words: cost-share program, ground water exploitation, induced irrigation
technology, nonjoint production, nonpoint-source pollution

Managing exploitation of ground water for agriculture and controlling nonpointsource pollution for public health have long been important issues for economists
and agricultural policymakers. In response to growing public concern about
ground water depletion and nonpoint-source contamination, the U.S. Congress
established, as part of the 1996 Farm Act, an agricultural cost-share program
known as the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) to encourage
producers to adopt resource-conserving and environmentally beneﬁcial
agricultural practices. However, there were some changes to EQIP in the 2008
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Farm Bill.1 For applications that included water conservation or irrigationeﬃciency conservation practices, the 2008 Farm Bill required the Natural
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) to give priority to applications that
demonstrated a reduction in water use by the agricultural operation:2
As a condition of receiving a higher ranking with the grouping of water conservation
applications, the producer agrees not to use any associated water savings to bring new
land under irrigation production, excluding incidental land needed for eﬃcient operations.
(Section 2503-Environmental Quality Incentives Program)

Irrigation practices that improved the eﬃciency of water use included precision
irrigation systems, automation of irrigation systems, and newer sensorcontrolled equipment (Lichtenberg, Majsztrik, and Saavoss 2015).
Since then, numerous studies have analyzed agricultural cost-sharing programs
using a variety of models, including dynamic models of management of
exploitation of ground water and nonpoint-source pollution (Wu et al. 1994,
Kim, Schaible, and Daberkow 2000), mathematical programming models for
conservation of irrigation water (Huﬀacker and Whittlesey 2003, Scheierling,
Young, and Cardon 2006), risk-programming models for conservation of
ground water (Peterson and Ding 2005), and multi-year optimization models
for conservation of ground water (Ward et al. 2008).
While numerous empirical studies have suggested that cost-sharing programs
are unlikely to reduce either use of irrigation water or nonpoint-source pollution
(Huﬀaker and Whittlesey 2003, Pfeiﬀer and Lin 2014, Ward et al. 2008, Wu et al.
1994), a few studies have provided some support for cost-sharing programs by
demonstrating that optimal applications of irrigation and fertilization do not
respond monotonically to changes in the eﬃciency of the irrigation system.
Peterson and Ding (2005) found that an irrigation system that provides
intermediate eﬃciency (sprinklers) results in greater water use while a higheﬃciency irrigation system (drip) results in less use of water than an
ineﬃcient ﬂood irrigation system. Similarly, Kim, Schaible, and Daberkow
(2000) found that adoption of cost-shared center-pivot systems reduces
contamination of ground water while other irrigation systems (tail-water
recovery and surge ﬂow) result in continued deterioration of the quality of
ground water. The changes in the EQIP program in 2008 reduce conversion of
acres from dryland to irrigated operations involving high-value crops,
potentially changing the results found in prior studies.
We revisit the eﬀects of the EQIP cost-share program on conservation of
ground water and management of nonpoint-source pollution by ameliorating
the shortcomings of the hydrologic and economic models used in previous

1

See the U.S. Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service 2014
publication “Subsurface Drip Irrigation: Conservation Today for Water Tomorrow.”
2
An example is the Precise Mobil Drip Irrigation (PMDI™) system patented by T-L Irrigation
Company in Nebraska (Bordovsky 2015).
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studies, in which (i) a partial analysis was associated with the eﬀects of the costshare program on either conservation of ground water or nonpoint-source
pollution but not both, (ii) economic beneﬁts from irrigation water and
nitrogen fertilizer uses were overestimated, (iii) the delayed response
associated with nitrate leaching and ground water return ﬂows was omitted,
(iv) critical elements of the nutrient cycle were omitted, and, most
importantly, (v) the process of developing and adopting induced irrigation
technologies was omitted.
Induced technical changes in irrigation systems occur in response to
government policies and market conditions. Once such a technology is
developed, producers typically delay adopting it if the net economic beneﬁt
from the new technology is lower than the net beneﬁt of conventional
technologies. Despite strong evidence that government policies and market
conditions inﬂuence the direction of technological change, the development
and subsequent adoption of induced irrigation technologies have not been
examined as a means of protecting aquifers from over-exploitation and
nonpoint-source nitrate contamination. Most of the earlier studies of
irrigation technologies dealt with either adoption (Burness and Brill 2001,
Ashwell and Peterson 2013, Shah, Zilberman, and Chakravorty 1995) or
development (Kim et al. 1996) but not both.
To endogenize the timing of development and adoption of new irrigation
systems in the future, we employ a hazard-function approach in which the
probabilities of developing and adopting a new irrigation technology are
inﬂuenced by the cost of adopting the new system. When the private beneﬁt
is insuﬃcient to encourage voluntary adoption, the public sector may be
justiﬁed in sharing the cost of adoption, particularly if the combined public
and private beneﬁts exceed the adoption cost.3
We derive the socially optimal rate of cost-share that would encourage the
irrigation industry to develop improved technologies and encourage
producers to adopt the induced technical change in irrigation system. We
further evaluate the eﬀect of the subsidy on ground water exploitation and
nonpoint-source nitrate pollution. Our model suggests that whether
producers generate greater water pollution when they adopt the improved
irrigation technology depends on whether the increased rate of irrigation
eﬃciency is greater or smaller than the increased rate of the marginal net
economic beneﬁt.
We discuss the economic beneﬁts of adopting an improved irrigation
technology on demand for ground water and nitrogen fertilizer and explicitly
account for changes in input-use eﬃciency. We then introduce development
of an induced irrigation technology in which irrigation enterprises respond to

3
When the private beneﬁt is insuﬃcient to cover the cost of adopting an improved irrigation
technology, cost-share programs would work as market-clearing instruments by shifting the
farmers’ demand function (i.e., adoption) for new irrigation technology upward.
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a rising cost for pumping of ground water and a government subsidy granted in
response to society’s willingness to pay to avoid depletion of ground water and
to protect water quality by allocating research and development (R&D) funds to
more-eﬃcient irrigation systems. After development of an induced irrigation
technology, the extent to which farmers are likely to adopt it depends largely
on the net economic beneﬁt resulting from its installation and maintenance.
Therefore, a subsidy rate, such as the one provided by EQIP, is incorporated
into the farmer’s adoption decision.
Since exploitation of ground water involves use of a ﬁnite natural resource,
we present a dynamic model of ground water and fertilizer use for irrigated
crop production. The model incorporates consumptive-equivalent uses of
irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer4 as well as critical elements of the
nutrient cycle and the delayed responses of return ﬂows of water and nitrate
leaching to the aquifer. We also incorporate uncertainty in the dates of
development and adoption of the induced irrigation technology.

Economic Beneﬁts from Irrigation-water and Nitrogen-fertilizer
Applications
Traditional crop-production functions assume that all of the variable inputs,
including irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer, are fully employed to
produce the crop output.5 If crop production and nonpoint-source pollution
are characterized by jointness in output, a crop-production function cannot
be estimated (Shumway, Pope, and Nash 1983). Therefore, the cropproduction process and generation of nonpoint-source pollution are moreappropriately characterized as nonjoint production processes (Kohli 1983,
Kim, Schaible, and Daberkow 2000). And since nitrates are highly soluble in
water and are transported into aquifers through return ﬂows of irrigation
water, both over-exploitation of ground water for irrigation and deterioration
in the quality of ground water from transported nutrients may be managed
by adopting irrigation technologies that use water more eﬃciently.
Aggregate production functions for estimating crop responses across ﬁelds or
regions with heterogeneity or nonuniformities in the distribution of inputs such
as irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer result in smooth nonlinear functions
that are concave with positive marginal products (Berck and Helfand 1990).
Therefore, we assume that the crop-production function is quadratic so that
the linear factor-demand functions are tractable mathematically. The

4
Consumptive-equivalent is deﬁned as the application rate of irrigation water multiplied by the
rate of irrigation eﬃciency.
5
Most prior studies considered management of either quantity or quality of ground water but
not both. Exceptions are Roseta-Palma (2003) and Wu et al. (1994), which used conventional
dynamic models of ground water management.
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crop-production function based on consumptive use of irrigation water, W*(t),
and consumptive use of nitrogen fertilizer, n*(t), is then represented by
(1)

Y ðW  ðt Þ; n ðt ÞÞ ¼ a0 þ a1 W  ðt Þ − a2 ðW  ðt ÞÞ2 þ a3 n ðt Þ
− a4 ðn ðt ÞÞ2 þ a5 W  ðt Þn ðt Þ

where Y is output, W*(t) and n*(t) are the consumptive use of irrigation water
and nitrates, respectively, and ai(i ¼ 0, 1, … 5) are positive parameters.
Since the producer’s costs for pumping and of fertilization are based on the
rates of irrigation water (W) and fertilizer (n) applied, it is more convenient
to present the crop-production function (equation 1) in terms of the rates of
consumptive-equivalent irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer applied. Since
nitrates are highly soluble in water and are transported to aquifers in
irrigation water, we assume that the fertilization eﬃciency is the same as the
irrigation eﬃciency to reduce complexity.
Let α0 > 0 be the rate of eﬃciency of the current irrigation technology such
that a linear transformation of the use of irrigation water (IW) is represented
by W*(t) ¼ α0W0(t) where W0 is the rate of IW applied using the current
irrigation technology. Similarly, the fertilization eﬃciency associated with the
current irrigation technology is represented by n*(t) ¼ α0[n0(t) þ f0N(t)]
where n0(t) is the amount of nitrogen fertilizer (NF) applied using the
current irrigation technology, N(t) is the nitrate stock in the aquifer, and f0 is
a fractional coeﬃcient representing the ratio of IW using the current
irrigation technology to the volume of water in the aquifer so that f0N(t)
represents the concentration of nitrates in the IW (i.e., the nutrient recycle).6
The crop-production function (equation 1), which is based on the
consumptive-equivalent rate of application of IW and NF, is then rewritten as
(2)

Y ðα0 W0 ðtÞ; α0 ðn0 ðtÞ þ f0 NðtÞÞÞ ¼ a0 þ a1 α0 W0 ðtÞ  a2 α20 ½W0 ðtÞ2
þ a3 α0 ½n0 ðtÞ þ f0 NðtÞ
 a4 α20 ½n0 ðtÞ þ f0 NðtÞ2
þ a5 α20 W0 ðtÞ½n0 ðtÞ þ f0 NðtÞ:

The marginal beneﬁts from the consumptive use of IW and NF diﬀer from the
marginal beneﬁts associated with the application rates for IW and NF. Let the

6

In fact, f0 changes over time as the stock of ground water and use of IW change (see Kim,
Schaible, and Daberkow 2000). However, we assume a constant fraction for simplicity.
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linear transformation of the marginal beneﬁt from consumptive use of IW be
represented by
Pw ¼

Pw0
α0

where Pw* and Pw0 are the marginal beneﬁts from IW based on the consumptive
use and the application rate, respectively. A linear transformation of the
marginal beneﬁt from use of NF is represented by
Pn ¼

Pn0
α0

where Pn* and Pn0 are the marginal beneﬁts from NF based on the consumptive
use and the application rate, respectively.
The consumptive-equivalent inverse IW and NF demand functions are then
represented by7
Pw0
¼ Py α0 f½a1 þ a5 α0 ðn0 (t) þ f0 N(t)Þ  2a2 α0 W0 (t)g
α0

(3)

or, equivalently,
(30 )

Pw0 ¼ Py α20 {[a1 þ a5 α0 (n0 (t) þ f0 N(t))]  2a2 α0 W0 (t)}:

Similarly, the inverse NF demand based on consumptive-equivalent NF use is
obtained using equation 2 as follows:
(4)

Pn0
¼ Py α0 {[a3  2a4 α0 f0 N(t) þ a5 α0 W0 (t)]  2a4 α0 n0 (t)}
α0

or, equivalently,

7

Both consumptive use of IW, W*(t), and the marginal beneﬁt from consumptive use of IW, Pw*,
must be linearly transformed using the irrigation eﬃciency rate to measure the economic beneﬁt
based on the irrigation application rate (Kim and Schaible 2000, Kim, Schaible, and Daberkow
2000). Omission of the linear transformation of Pw* leads to overstatement of the economic
beneﬁt from use of IW and to the magnitude of estimation bias being proportional to the rate
of irrigation ineﬃciency. Studies that avoided such bias include Peterson and Ding (2005) and
Pfeiﬀer and Lin (2014), which used direct proﬁt-maximization models.
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Pn0 ¼ Py α20 {[a3  2a4 α0 f0 N(t) þ a5 α0 W0 (t)]  2a4 α0 n0 (t)}:

Using equations 30 and 40 , the economic beneﬁts from IW and NF use are
represented in equations 5 and 6, respectively.
(5)

W0 ðtÞ

BðW0 : Pw0 Þ ¼ ∫0

Py α20 f½a1 þ a5 α0 ðn0 ðtÞ þ f0 NðtÞÞ  2a2 α0 xgdx

¼ Py α20 f½a1 þ a5 α0 ðn0 ðtÞ þ f0 NðtÞÞW0 ðtÞ  a2 α0 W02 ðtÞg
(6)

n0 ðtÞ

Bðn0 : Pnn Þ ¼ ∫0

Py α20 f½a3 þ a5 α0 W0 ðtÞ  2a4 α0 f0 NðtÞ  2a4 α0 xgdx

¼ Py α20 f½a3 þ a5 α0 W0 ðtÞ  2a4 α0 f0 NðtÞn0 ðtÞ  a4 α0 n20 ðtÞg
As producers adopt improved irrigation systems, the inverse demand curves for
IW and NF shift to either the right or the left. To investigate whether adoption of
an eﬃcient irrigation technology would lead to increased or decreased use of
IW, the diﬀerential of equation 30 with respect to the eﬃciency rate, α0, is
given in equation 7:
(7)






∂W0 (t) ∂W0 (t) ∂n0 (t)
1 ∂W0 (t)
¼
[Py a1 α20 þ Pw0 (η  3)]

∂α0
∂n0 (t)
∂α0
α0 ∂Pw0
>¼< 0

where
η¼

∂Pw0 α0
∂α0 Pw0

is the technology elasticity of the marginal beneﬁt of IW or, equivalently,
(70 )





∂W0 ðtÞ ∂W0 ðtÞ ∂n0 ðtÞ
>¼< 0 if

∂α0
∂n0 ðtÞ
∂α0



Py a1 α20
η <¼> 3 
:
Pw0

The lefthand side of the equality in equation 70 represents the aggregate
marginal change in use of IW as the irrigation eﬃciency changes. The ﬁrst
and second terms represent the direct and indirect (through a
complementary input) marginal change in use of IW. The result from 70
indicates that the demand curve for IW shifts to the right (left) as irrigation
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eﬃciency improves (declines) depending on whether the change in the rate of
the marginal beneﬁt of IW when the change in irrigation eﬃciency is less than
(greater than)

3


Py a1 α20
:
Pw0

Similarly, the diﬀerential of equation 40 with respect to the rate of irrigation
eﬃciency, α0, is given by
(8)







∂n0 (t) ∂n0 (t) ∂W0 (t)
1 ∂n0 (t) 
¼
Py a3 α20 þ Pn0 (ε  3)

∂α0
∂W0 (t)
∂α0
α0 ∂Pn0
>¼< 0

where
ε¼

∂Pn0 α0
∂α0 Pn0

is the technology elasticity of the marginal beneﬁt of NF. Equation 8 can be
rewritten as
(80 )




∂n0 (t) ∂n0 (t) ∂W0 (t)
>¼< 0 if

∂α0
∂W0 (t)
∂α0



Py a3 α20
ε <¼> 3 
:
Pn0

The result in 80 also indicates that the demand function for NF would shift
right (left) as an improved irrigation technology is adopted depending on
whether the rate of increase of the marginal beneﬁt of NF is less than
(greater than)



Py a3 α20
3
:
Pn0

The results in equations 70 and 80 provide some indication of whether use of IW
and NF increases or decreases because of adoption of an improved irrigation
technology. However, those equations are derived from the inverse demand
functions for IW and NF in equations 30 and 40 , respectively, and any
economic interpretation that is based on factor-demand functions can be
somewhat misleading because those functions do not account for the process
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of adoption of technology. Therefore, we use the optimal economic properties of
use of IW and NF to further examine how producers adapt their use of IW and
NF when they adopt improved irrigation technologies.

Development and Adoption of Induced Irrigation Technologies
Development
Irrigation enterprises respond to the economic and policy incentives provided
to producers.8 Endogenous technological changes can be assigned to one of two
broad, disjointed categories: invention and learning by doing (Romer 1990,
1994, Young 1993). We focus on development of new irrigation technologies
through deliberate research by government agencies, academics, and
irrigation enterprises to resolve regional problems. As a factor of production
(IW in this case) becomes increasingly scarce (more costly) and government
agencies subsidize the cost of adopting more-eﬃcient irrigation technologies,
irrigation enterprises allocate more R&D resources to developing
technologies that save or substitute for the scarce resource (Hayami and
Ruttan 1985, Kamien and Schwartz 1978, Kim et al. 1996). We do not
distinguish between public and private research as the eﬀorts are often
collaborative (Center for Irrigation Technology 2015, Irrigation Association
2015, Irrigation Technology Center 2015).
In our dynamic framework of ground water management, we use a hazard
function to explain development of an induced irrigation technology.9 We
assume that the probability of developing technology i at a given point in
time (prior to that technical innovation occurring) is an increasing function of
(i) the capital stock (K(t | k, gi)) of irrigation system manufacturers,10 which
depends on the cost of energy to pump one acre-foot of ground water per
foot of lift (k) and the government subsidy rate to producers to adopt
improved irrigation technologies (gi), and (ii) the amortized annual unit price
of an induced irrigation system (zi(t)).11

8
According to Bordovsky (2015), who invented the Low Energy Precision Application (LEPA)
system, the irrigation industry makes capital investments to resolve regional problems rather
than national or international problems: “A logic follows that a solution for a speciﬁc regional
problem would likely be applicable to other regions or globally at some point in the future.”
9
Use of a hazard-function approach while considering uncertainty of the timing of innovation
derived from research investments was ﬁrst suggested by Kieﬀer (1988), and Kim et al. (2010)
applied a hazard-function approach associated with development and adoption of innovative
technology in managing invasive species.
10
Mann (1975) showed how annual capital investment ﬂows could be represented by capital
stock in dynamic proﬁt-maximization models.
11
NRCS currently provides subsidies (cost-shares) of up to 75 percent to producers to adopt
eﬃcient irrigation systems such as subsurface drip irrigation in Texas. We assume that the
irrigation industry responds to higher pumping costs and government subsidies as an
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Let Mi(t) be the probability that a new more-eﬃcient irrigation technology is
developed by time t when Mi(0) ¼ 0 and 0 ≤ Mi(t) ≤ 1. The conditional
probability of developing a technical innovation at time t, mi[zi(t), Ki(t | k, gi)],
is the probability that development of such an innovation will occur during
the next time period, t þ Δt, given that it had not been developed at time t.
The probability that development of a technical innovation occurring by time
t is then represented as
(9)

Mi ðt Þ ¼ 1–exp½ –bi mi ðzi ðt Þ; Ki ðt j k; gi ÞÞt

where bi ¼ 1/(1 þ φ) and φ is the time elasticity of the hazard rate.12 The
probability density function, which is obtained by diﬀerentiating equation 9
with respect to time variable t, is then written as a state equation:
(10)

∂Mi (t)
¼ mi [zi (t), Ki (t j k, gi )](1  Mi (t))
∂t

where
mi (t ¼ 0) ¼ 0, ∂mi =∂zi > 0, ∂mi =∂Ki > 0, t ≠ 0
is the probability density function for development of the induced irrigation
technology.
Once technical innovation occurs at time t*, the economic and environmental
beneﬁts associated with use of IW and NF depend largely on whether the
technology is adopted.

Adoption
Once an induced technology is developed, its adoption may be delayed if it does
not provide a greater net economic beneﬁt (πi) than use of the conventional
technology (π0). Burness and Brill (2001) and Ashwell and Peterson (2013)
considered models of adoption of an improved irrigation technology by
producers without development of a new irrigation technology, and Shah,
Zilberman, and Chakravorty (1995) considered the process of adoption of an
irrigation technology without considering capital investments.
indication of society’s willingness to pay to improve farm incomes and avoid over-exploitation of
ground water and nonpoint-source contamination of ground water.
12
The time elasticity of the hazard rate, φ, is an unknown parameter, but it can be derived from
an estimated hazard function.
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Let Vi(θ) be the probability of adoption of the ith induced irrigation
technology developed at time θ ≥ t* where Vi(θ ¼ t*) ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ Vi(θ) ≤ 1. A
producer’s decision to adopt an improved irrigation system depends on how
much the cost of pumping ground water is rising (mc(θ)), the amortized
annual capital costs associated with adoption and maintenance of the new
system (zi(θ)), the government subsidy rate (gi), and the cost of any
consultants needed to learn how to operate the new system (E(θ)). Since the
agricultural irrigation industry is largely unregulated and lacks independent
design standards for irrigation systems (Center for Irrigation Technology
2015), most agricultural irrigators do not have the expertise necessary to
determine if the system will perform as claimed. Therefore, agricultural
irrigators must be trained to use new systems.
The conditional probability of adopting a new ith irrigation technology at
time θ,
vi [E(θ), mc(θ), (1  gi )zi (θ) j πi > π0 ],
is the probability that adoption of such an innovation will occur during the next
time period, θ þ Δθ, given that the new technology had not been adopted at
time θ where πi is the expected proﬁt resulting from adoption of the
technology. We also assume that time of adoption of an innovation is
uncertain and that the likelihood of adoption can be expressed as
(11)

Vi (θ) ¼ 1  exp[ σi vi (E(θ), mc(θ), (1  gi )zi (θ) j πi > π0 )]θ

where σi ¼ 1/(1 þ ψ) and ψ is the time elasticity of the hazard rate.
The probability density function, ∂Vi(θ)/∂θ, which is obtained from equation
11, is represented as a state equation in our model as
(12)

∂Vi ðθÞ
¼ vi ½E ðθÞ; mcðθÞ; ð1–gi Þzi ðθÞ j πi > π0 ½1–Vi ðθÞ
∂θ

where vi(θ ¼ t*) ¼ 0 and
∂vi
∂vi
∂vi
∂vi
< 0,
> 0,
< 0, and
> 0:
∂E
∂mc
∂zi
∂gi
Equation 10, associated with development of an induced irrigation technology,
and equation 12, associated with adoption of the technology, are then
incorporated as state equations into a nested optimal control model of ground
water and nitrate stock management.
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Dynamic Model of Irrigation and Nitrogen Fertilizer Applications
Applications of NFs by farmers generate both economic beneﬁts, as shown in
equation 6, and ground water pollution as an externality. In shallow aquifers
underlying highly permeable soils, fertilizer applications and corresponding
nitrate leaching can be assumed as simultaneous without loss. In areas where
the farm land is above deep aquifers that have low permeability, one can
expect that there will be a long time lag between application of the fertilizer
and corresponding contamination of the ground water. Estimates of the
contamination externality that ignore the time lag may underestimate the
user cost associated with stock of nitrates in the aquifer (Kim, Hostetler, and
Amacher 1993, Nkonya and Featherstone 2000).
Since nitrates are transported to the aquifer in soluble form through IW, we
model changes in the stock of nitrates in the aquifer as
N_ (t) ≈ (1  α0 )[n0 (t  τ) þ f0 N(t  τ)] þ (1  αi )[ni (t  τ)
þ fi N(t  τ)]  {f0 þ fi þ ρ} N(t)

(13)

where α0 and αi are the rate of irrigation eﬃciency of the conventional irrigation
system and the ith induced irrigation technology, respectively, and αi(i ≠ 0) >
α0, τ is a time lag;13 f0N(t) and fiN(t) are the amounts of nitrate removal from
the aquifer through irrigation with the conventional and ith irrigation
technology (i.e., nutrient recycle), respectively; and ρ is the net natural
discharge rate and denitriﬁcation.
Similarly, the hydrologic diﬀerential equation is represented by
(14)

_
h(t)
≈



R þ [(1  α0 )W0 (t  τ)  W0 (t)] þ [(1  αi )Wi (t  τ)  Wi (t)]
AS

where h(t) represents how many feet the water table is above sea level, R is the
natural recharge rate, A is the number of acres over the aquifer, S is the
storativity coeﬃcient, and W0 and Wi are the amount of IW applied with
the conventional and ith irrigation technologies, respectively.
Since adoption of an induced irrigation technology can occur only after the
technology is developed, the expected action-value function (EV) associated
with ground water management to be maximized for use of IW and NF under
uncertain dates of development and adoption can be represented by a nested

We assume that the time lags associated with return ﬂows of IW and leaching of nitrate are
the same for the conventional and the induced irrigation technologies.
13
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action-value function as follows (Kim et al. 2010, Lewandrowski, Kim, and
Aillery 2014):14
(15)

T

Max EV ¼ ∫0 eδt fð1  Mi ðtÞÞ½NBðW0 ðtÞÞ þ NBðn0 ðtÞÞ
þ Mi ðtÞ½Vi ðtÞfNBðWi ðtÞÞ þ NBðni ðtÞÞ  ð1  gi Þzi g
þ ð1  Vi ðtÞÞfNBðW0 ðtÞÞ þ NBðn0 ðtÞÞggdt
T

¼ ∫0 eδt f½NBðW0 ðtÞÞ þ NBðn0 ðtÞÞ
þ Mi ðtÞVi ðtÞ½NB ðWi ðtÞÞ
þ NBðni ðtÞÞ  ð1  gi Þzi  NBðW0 ðtÞÞ  NBðn0 ðtÞÞgdt
where
NBðW0 ðtÞÞ ¼ fPy α20 ½a1 þ a5 α0 ðn0 ðtÞ þ f0 NðtÞÞ  kðSL  hðtÞÞg W0 ðtÞ
 Py α30 a2 W02 ðtÞ
NBðn0 ðtÞÞ ¼ fPy α20 ½a3 þ a5 α0 W0 ðtÞ  2a4 α0 f0 NðtÞ  qg n0 ðtÞ
 Py α30 a4 n20 ðtÞ
NBðWi ðtÞÞ ¼ fPy α2i ½a1 þ a5 αi ðni ðtÞ þ fi NðtÞÞ  kðSL  hðtÞÞg Wi ðtÞ
 Py α3i a2 Wi2 ðtÞ
NBðni ðtÞÞ ¼ fPy α2i ½a3 þ a5 αi Wi ðtÞ
 2a4 αi fi NðtÞ  qg ni ðtÞ  Py α3i a4 n2i ðtÞ
and T is terminal time, δ is the rate of discount, k(SL – h(t)) is the marginal
pumping cost per acre where k is a constant pumping cost per acre-foot of
ground water per foot of lift, SL is the elevation in feet of land above sea
level, and q is the unit price of NF.
The expected action-value function in equation 15, which measures the
present value of the expected net beneﬁt from use of IW and NF, assumes
that the induced technology is developed with probability Mi(t) and is
subsequently adopted with probability Vi(t) while the probability of using the
conventional irrigation technology is (1 – Vi(t)).
The dynamic optimization problem of maximizing the expected net social
welfare of use of ground water and NF in the presence of development and

14

See Sutton and Barto (1998) for the action-value function.
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adoption of an induced irrigation technology with uncertainty is expressed by
maximizing the action-value function in equation 15 subject to the state
equations, 10, 12, 13, and 14. The current-value Hamiltonian equation is then
presented as
(16)

H ¼ f½NBðW0 ðtÞÞ þ NBðn0 ðtÞÞ þ Mi ðtÞVi ðtÞ½NBðWi ðtÞÞ þ NBðni ðtÞÞ
 ð1  gi Þzi  NBðW0 ðtÞÞ  NBðn0 ðtÞÞg
þ

λ1 ðtÞ
fR þ ½ð1  α0 ÞW0 ðt  τÞW0 ðtÞþ½ð1αi ÞWi ðt  τÞ  Wi ðtÞg
AS

þ λ 2 ðtÞfð1  α0 Þ½n0 ðt  τÞ þ f0 Nðt  τÞ
þ ð1  αi Þ½ni ðt  τÞ þ fi Nðt  τÞ  ½ f0 þ fi þ ρNðtÞg
þ λ3 ðtÞ fmi ½zi ðtÞ; Ki ðtjk; gi Þ½1  Mi ðtÞg
þ λ4 ðtÞ fvi ½Ei ðτÞ; mcðτÞ; ð1  gi Þzi ðτÞjπi > π0  ½1–Vi ðτÞg
hðt Þ ¼ h0 for –τ  t  0
~ 0 for –τ  t  0
N ðt Þ ¼ N
Mi ðt Þ ¼ 0 for –τ  t  0
Vi ðt Þ ¼ 0 for –τ  t  0
where W0(t), Wi(t), n0(t), ni(t), and gi are control variables; h(t), N(t), Mi(t), and
Vi(t) are state variables; and λ1(t), λ2(t), λ3(t), and λ4(t) are adjoint variables
associated with h(t), N(t), Mi(t), and Vi(t), respectively.
The necessary conditions for control variables are presented in equations
17-1 through 19 (the optimality conditions for the state and adjoint variables
are presented in Appendix A, which is available from the authors).15
(17-1)

∂H
∂H
þ
jðt þ τÞ ¼ 0 for 0  t < T  τ;
∂W0 ðtÞ ∂W0 ðt  τÞ
which implies that


∂Bðn0 ðtÞÞ
λ1 ðtÞ
¼
ð1  Mi ðtÞVi ðtÞÞ Pw0  kðSL  hðtÞÞ þ
∂W0 ðtÞ
AS


15

ð1  α0 Þλ1 ðt þ τÞ
AS

We assumed a weaker version of suﬃcient conditions to assure optimality (see Stengel
(1994)).
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∂H
¼ 0 for T  τ  t  T;
∂W0 ðtÞ
which implies that


∂Bðn0 ðtÞÞ
λ1 ðtÞ
¼
ð1  Mi ðtÞVi ðtÞÞ Pw0  kðSL  hðtÞÞ þ
∂W0 ðtÞ
AS

(17-3)

∂H
∂H
þ
jðt þ τÞ ¼ 0 for 0  t < T  τ;
∂Wi ðtÞ ∂Wi ðt  τÞ
which implies that


∂Bðni ðtÞÞ
λ 1 ðtÞ
¼
ðMi ðtÞVi ðtÞÞ Pwi  kðSL  hðtÞÞ þ
∂Wi ðtÞ
AS


(17-4)

ð1  αi Þλ1 ðt þ τÞ
AS

∂H
¼ 0 for t  τ  t  T,
∂Wi (t)
which implies that


∂B(ni (t))
λ1 (t)
¼
(Mi (t)Vi (t)) Pwi  k(SL  h(t)) þ
∂Wi (t)
AS

(18-1)

∂H
∂H
þ
j (t þ τ) ¼ 0 for 0  t < T  τ,
∂n0 (t) ∂n0 (t þ τ)
which implies that


∂B(W0 (t))
¼ (1  α0 )λ2 (t þ τ)
(1  Mi (t)Vi (t)) Pn0  q þ
∂n0 (t)

(18-2)

∂H
¼ 0 for T  τ  t  T;
∂n0 ðtÞ
which implies that


∂BðW0 ðtÞÞ
¼0
ð1  Mi ðtÞVi ðtÞÞ Pn0  q þ
∂n0 ðtÞ
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∂H
∂H
þ
j (t þ τ) ¼ 0 for 0  t < T  τ,
∂ni (t) ∂ni (t  τ)
which implies that


∂B(Wi (t))
¼ (1  αi )λ 2 (t þ τ)
Mi (t)Vi (t) Pni  q þ
∂ni (t)

(18-4)

∂H
¼ 0 for T  τ  t  T,
∂ni (t)
which implies that


∂B(Wi (t))
¼0
Mi (t)Vi (t) Pni  q þ
∂ni (t)

(19)

∂H
¼ 0 for 0  t  T;
∂gi
which implies that

 

∂mi ðtÞ
Mi ðtÞVi ðtÞzi þ ½1  Mi ðtÞVi ðtÞ bi t
∂gi


∂vi ðtÞ
½BðWi ðtÞÞ þ Bðni ðtÞÞ
þ Mi ðtÞ½1  Vi ðtÞσi t
∂gi
 BðW0 ðtÞÞ  Bðn0 ðtÞÞ



∂mi ðtÞ
¼ λ3 ðtÞð1  Mi ðtÞÞ½1  bi mi t
∂gi


∂vi ðtÞ
 λ4 ðtÞð1  Vi ðtÞÞ½1  σi vi t
∂gi

The economic interpretation of optimal conditions presented in equations 17-1
through 19 is better served by ﬁrst explaining the adjoint variables λ1(t)
through λ4(t), which are presented in Appendix B (available from the authors).
Adjoint variable λ1(t), which measures the marginal contribution of state
variable h(t) to the expected action-value function in equation 15, is positive,
as shown in equation B.1. As the level of the water table in feet rises, the
pumping cost to producers declines and the net economic beneﬁt increases.
Adjoint variable λ2(t), which measures the marginal contribution of state
variable N(t) to the expected action-value function, is negative, as shown in
equation B.2. Since the nitrates available in the IW and the NF are perfect
substitutes, producers reduce their applications of NF when the nitrates
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available in ground water increase. Therefore, the economic beneﬁt from use of
NF declines when greater amounts of nitrates are available from the IW at no
cost. This result indicates that economic and environmental beneﬁts increase
as the stock of nitrates in the ground water is reduced by adoption of an
improved irrigation technology.
Adjoint variable λ4(t) in equation B.4, which measures the marginal
contribution of state variable Vi(t) to the expected action-value function
associated with an increase in the probability of adopting a new improved
irrigation technology, is positive. This result, however, requires that adjoint
variable λ3(t) in equation B.3, which measures the marginal contribution of
state variable Mi(t) to the expected action-value function associated with an
increase in the probability of developing an improved irrigation technology, is
positive. Adoption of an improved irrigation technology, therefore, requires
that the associated net economic beneﬁt over time be greater than the
beneﬁt accrued by use of the conventional irrigation technology. With this
knowledge regarding the adjoint variables, we can interpret the optimal
conditions presented in equations 17-1 through 19.
Since IW and NF are complementary inputs in crop production, the results in
equations 17-1 (conventional) and 17-3 (induced new technology) illustrate
that eﬃcient use of ground water for irrigation requires the sum of the
expected marginal net economic beneﬁt from use of IW and increase in the
amount of complementary NF used to equal the cost associated with use of
ground water minus the cost associated with delayed return ﬂows of ground
water. The results show, therefore, that models that do not consider
development and adoption of an improved irrigation technology overestimate
the marginal net economic beneﬁt, and models that do not consider the time
lag associated with return ﬂows underestimate the cost of using ground water,
which leads to a greater use of ground water than is optimal for irrigation.
Equations 17-2 and 17-4 show how, at the terminal time period, the marginal
net economic beneﬁt from use of IW is overstated when development and
adoption of an irrigation technology is not considered, causing producers to
use more ground water than is optimal for irrigation.
Equations 18-1 (conventional technology) and 18-3 (improved technology)
show that the expected net economic beneﬁt from use of NF must equal the
user cost when incorporating the time lags associated with return ﬂows
and leaching. When development and adoption of an improved irrigation
technology are not considered, the marginal net economic beneﬁt from use of NF
would be overstated, and the user cost would be overstated when failing to
account for the time lag associated with nitrate leaching. Equations 18-2 and 184 demonstrate that eﬃcient use of NF in the terminal period under each
irrigation technology requires that the marginal beneﬁt from use of NF equals
the marginal cost of use.
We ﬁnd that the economic properties of the optimal government subsidy are
more complex than prior studies have considered. Equation 19 shows that,
under the optimal government subsidy to encourage producers to adopt an
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induced irrigation technology, the sum of (i) the expected price of the induced
irrigation system, (ii) the expected foregone beneﬁt from failing to develop it,
and (iii) the expected foregone beneﬁt from failing to adopt it equals the sum
of (i) the user cost from failing to develop the system and (ii) the user cost to
adopt a new technology.

Eﬀects of a Cost-share Program on Ground Water Exploitation and Nitrate
Stocks
Using the optimal conditions of use of IW and NF in equations 17-1 and 18-4,
we evaluate the eﬀects of a cost-share program on use of IW and NF. The
government subsidy (gi) to encourage producers to adopt better irrigation
systems was treated as a control variable in the preceding section (see
equation 19). To gain qualitative insight into the properties of optimal
decision rules, we must discuss how the subsidy aﬀects the cost to the user
associated with nitrate and ground water stocks over time. Therefore, we
now treat the government subsidy to producers as an exogenous variable.
Though comparative dynamic analyses can be used to evaluate expected
changes in the shadow values, λ1 through λ4 (Kim et al. 1996), such an
analysis is needlessly complex, and we therefore use a simpler approach to
evaluate the eﬀects of a government subsidy.
For convenience, we let the time lag, τ, be zero in equations 17-1
(conventional irrigation) and 17-3 (improved irrigation). The cost of pumping
ground water is then represented as
82
3
∂B(n0 (t))
(20)
>
>
P

k(SL

h(t))
þ
w0
(AS) <6
∂W0 (t) 7
6
7
λ1 (t) ¼
4
5
α0
2 >
>
:
20
1
∂B(ni (t))
6BPwi  k(SL  h(t)) þ ∂Wi (t) C
B
C
þ (Mi (t)Vi (t))6
4@
A
αi
0
139
∂B(n0 (t))
>
>
BPw0  k(SL  h(t)) þ ∂W0 (t) C7=
C7 :
B
@
A5>
α0
>
;
Similarly, the cost associated with nitrate stocks in ground water is obtained
from equations 18-1 (traditional irrigation) and 18-3 (improved irrigation)
under the assumption that τ ¼ 0:
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3
2
∂B(W0 (t))
P qþ
6 n0
7 (Mi (t)Vi (t))
∂n0 (t)
6
7þ
λ 2 (t) ¼ 4
5
2(1  α0 )
2
80
1 0
19
∂B(W0 (t))
∂B(Wi (t)) >
>
>
>
<BPn0  q þ
B Pni  q þ ∂ni (t) C=
∂n0 (t) C
B
CB
C :
@
A @
A>
>
(1  α0 )
(1  αi )
>
>
:
;

Inserting equations 9 and 11 for Mi(t) and Vi(t), respectively, into equations 20
and 21 and then diﬀerentiating the resulting equations with respect to the rate
of the government subsidy, gi, results in
(22)

20
1
∂B(ni (t))
BPwi  k(SL  h(t)) þ ∂Wi (t) C
∂λ1 (t) (AS) 6
6B
C
¼
A
αi
∂gi
2 4@
0
13
∂B(n0 (t))
P

k(SL

h(t))
þ
w
B 0
7
∂W0 (t) C
C7
B
@
A
5
α0




 
∂mi
∂vi
þ Mi (t)(1  Vi (t))σi t
× Vi (t)(1  Mi (t))bi t
∂gi
∂gi
>¼< 0:

(23)

20
1 0
13
∂B(W0 (t))
∂B(Wi (t))
P

q
þ
P

q
þ
n
n
B 0
B i
7
∂λ 2 (t) 1 6
∂n0 (t) C
∂ni (t) C
B
CB
C7
¼ 6
@
A
@
A
4
5
(1  α0 )
(1  αi )
∂gi
2



 
∂mi
∂vi
× Vi (t)(1  Mi (t))bi t
þ Mi (t)(1  Vi (t))σi t
∂gi
∂gi
>¼< 0:

The marginal eﬀect of the government subsidy on the cost associated with
ground water and the nitrate stock in the aquifer are obtained from
equations 22 and 23, respectively, as follows.
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0

∂λ1 (t)
>¼< 0
∂gi

if

1
∂B(ni (t))
 
B Pwi  k(SL  h(t)) þ ∂Wi (t) C
αi
C
<¼>B
@
∂B(n0 (t))A
α0
Pw0  k(SL  h(t)) þ
∂W0 (t)

∂λ2 (t)
>¼< 0 if
∂gi



1  αi
1  α0



0

1
∂B(Wi (t))
P

q
þ
B ni
∂ni (t) C
C
>¼<B
@
∂B(W0 (t))A
Pn0  q þ
∂n0 (t)

Equation 24 shows that the user cost associated with the ground water stock
increases (decreases) as the rate of the government subsidy increases when the
rate of increase in irrigation eﬃciency is less than (greater than) the rate of
increase in the marginal net economic beneﬁt resulting from adoption of an
improved irrigation technology. When the rate of increase in the marginal net
economic beneﬁt is greater than the rate of increase in irrigation eﬃciency,
producers use more IW and the user cost associated with the ground water stock
increases. Most earlier empirical studies (e.g., Huﬀaker and Whittlesey 2003,
Pfeiﬀer and Lin 2014) support this outcome, ﬁnding that adoption of an induced
irrigation technology can lead to a greater use of ground water because some
producers switch to high-value crops and/or convert from dryland production to
irrigated production. However, when the rate of increase in irrigation eﬃciency is
greater than the rate of increase in the marginal net economic beneﬁt, less water
is used relative to an ineﬃcient irrigation system because some producers invest
more capital in IW to drive down the marginal net economic beneﬁt. This result
is partially supported by Peterson and Ding (2005).
Similarly, equation 25 shows that the user cost associated with the nitrate
stocks in the aquifer decreases (increases) as the rate of the government
subsidy increases when the rate of increase in the marginal net economic
beneﬁt from adoption of an improved irrigation technology is greater than
the rate of reduction of nitrate leaching. In that case, producers use a greater
amount of nitrates so the user cost associated with the nitrate stocks in the
ground water declines (becomes more negative) as the subsidy rate
increases. This result is consistent with several earlier studies (Shaﬀer,
Halvorson, and Pierce 1991, Wu et al. 1994). It suggests that a reduction in
pollution by adoption of an induced irrigation technology could lead to an
increase in the nitrate stocks because of the endogenous technological
change. When the rate of reduction in nitrate leaching is greater than the rate
of increase in the marginal net economic beneﬁt, producers use less nitrates
and the user cost increases (becomes less negative), as demonstrated by Kim,
Schaible, and Daberkow (2000).
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Table 1. Revenues, Pumping Costs, and Net Beneﬁts by Well Capacity and
System Type
300 Gallon per Minute

500 Gallon per Minute

Well Capacity

Well Capacity

Flood

Sprinkler

Drip

Flood

Sprinkler

Drip

Application eﬃciency

0.60

0.75

1.00

0.60

0.75

1.00

Seasonal irrigation
(acre-feet)

1.35

1.61

1.27

1.97

2.00

1.91

Consumptive seasonal
irrigation (acrefeet)

0.81

1.21

1.27

1.18

1.50

1.91

Yield (bushels per
acre)

118.32

146.87

150.35

147.15

167.58

183.37

Revenue (dollars per
acre)a

269.77

334.86

342.80

335.50

382.08

418.08

Pumping cost (dollars
per acre)

34.74

56.51

40.90

45.06

62.64

55.90

Net revenue (dollars
per acre)

235.03

278.35

301.90

290.44

319.44

362.18

Average net economic
beneﬁt (dollars per
acre-foot)

174.10

172.89

237.72

147.43

159.72

189.62

Water volume
pumped (acrefeet)b

215.47

202.49

203.51

314.53

252.00

305.47

a

Corn price of $2.28 per bushel.
Acreages for the ﬂood, sprinkler, and drip irrigation systems are based on 160, 126, and 160 acres,
respectively.
Source: Peterson and Ding (2005).

b

Numerical Illustration
Most previous studies of conjunctive use of ground and surface water at the
river-basin level employed mathematical programming models (Huﬀaker and
Whittlesey 2003, Ward and Pulido-Velazquez 2008) or ground water
management (Peterson and Ding 2005) to compare use of IW before and
after adoption of an improved irrigation technology. To provide a numerical
example that we could compare to our predictions, we obtained data from
Peterson and Ding (2005), which studied the impact of an improvement in
irrigation eﬃciency achieved by converting from ﬂood to center-pivot and
drip irrigation systems on conservation of ground water in western portions
of the high plains in Kansas for continuous corn production (see Table 1).
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We ﬁnd a rate of increase in irrigation eﬃciency of 1.25 for sprinkler
irrigation and 1.67 for drip irrigation, a rate of increase in the marginal
(average) net beneﬁt for a 300-gallon-per-minute well capacity of 0.99 for
sprinkler irrigation and 1.37 for drip irrigation, and a rate of increase in the
marginal net beneﬁt for a 500-gallon-per-minute well capacity of 1.08 for
sprinkler irrigation and 1.29 for drip irrigation. These results show that the
increase in the rate of irrigation eﬃciency is greater than the increase in the
rate of marginal net beneﬁt for both sprinkler and drip irrigation systems
regardless of pumping capacity. Therefore, applications of water would
decrease after adoption of an improved irrigation technology. Table 1 shows
that water applications increase with sprinkler irrigation and decrease with
drip irrigation as expected.
Pfeiﬀer and Lin (2014) also evaluated the eﬀects of converting traditional
center-pivot irrigation systems to highly eﬃcient dropped-nozzle center-pivot
systems on conservation of ground water in western Kansas. Their empirical
results show that the shift to a more-eﬃcient irrigation technology increased
extraction of ground water, in part due to a shift to high-value crops that led
to a higher marginal net economic beneﬁt from the use of IW.
Conclusions
While the EQIP cost-share program is designed to protect aquifers from overexploitation and nonpoint-source pollution by inducing producers and
irrigation enterprises to experiment with and develop new, more-eﬃcient
irrigation technologies, numerous empirical studies have shown that the
program is unlikely to reduce either depletion of the aquifers or nonpointsource pollution. We revisit this issue by reﬁning traditional models of
ground water dynamics by incorporating (i) development and adoption of an
induced irrigation technology, (ii) time lags associated with return ﬂows of
ground water and leaching of nitrates, and (iii) a more accurate
representation of the economic beneﬁts of use of IW and NF.
We ﬁnd that the economic properties of the optimal cost-share program are
considerably more complex than previous studies considered. The optimal
government subsidy to encourage producers to adopt an induced irrigation
technology requires that the sum of (i) the expected price of the induced
irrigation system, (ii) the expected foregone beneﬁt from failing to develop
the new technology, and (iii) the expected foregone beneﬁt from failing to
adopt the new technology must equal the sum of the costs to the user of
failing to develop and to adopt the new technology.
In summary, we ﬁnd that the optimal irrigation and fertilization rates do not
respond monotonically to changes in the eﬃciency of the irrigation system.
Whether producers decrease (increase) IW and NF as they adopt improved
irrigation technologies depends on whether the increase in the rate of
irrigation eﬃciency is greater than (less than) the increase in the rate of the
marginal net economic beneﬁt. Therefore, we ﬁnd that a greater use of water
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and fertilizer after adoption of an induced, more-eﬃcient irrigation technology
depends largely on whether producers switch to high-value crops.
Supplementary Materials
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/
10.1017/age.2016.19
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